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APOLLO  EXPERIENCE REPORT 
WINDOW  CONTAMINATION 
By L. J. Leger and R. W. Bricker 
Manned  Spacecraft  Center 
SUMMARY 
All five command  module windows on each of the first three manned Apollo flights 
were contaminated  while  the  spacecraft was in  earth  orbit.  This  contamination  accu- 
mulated  most  often  on  the  inner  surface of the  outer  pane  and on the  outer  surface of 
the  middle pane of the  three-pane window. By means of astronaut  debriefing and post- 
flight  examination of the  recovered  command  module,  three  main  sources of contamina- 
tion were identified: escape-tower-engine plumes, expulsion of waste water, and 
outgassing of elastomeric  sealants. 
Because  contamination on the  middle  pane was a serious  problem, a concentrated 
effort was made  to  eliminate  the  source of this contamination. The contamination was 
identified, by means of chemical  analysis, as a silicone  oil  that  resulted  from  outgas- 
sing of elastomeric window materials. By means of weight-loss  experiments on these 
materials? it was demonstrated  that a solution  to  the  problem would be a 48-hour  vacu- 
um bake of all appropriate  sealants at 200" C before  installation. Use of this  technique 
reduced window contamination  to an acceptable  level. 
As a result of the  problems  encountered  with  the Apollo command  module  win- 
dows, tests were conducted on a lunar  module  forward window before  manned  flight of 
a lunar  module. The results of these tests indicated  that no serious  contamination 
would be encountered on the lunar  module window. This  conclusion was verified in 
subsequent  manned  flights. 
INTRODUCTION 
The first window used  in  the U. S. manned  space  flight  program  was  on  the  Mer- 
cury  spacecraft. In this  case, only one window (consisting of four  panes) was provided. 
Because of its size,  the window provided only limited  visibility, and it received only 
limited  exposure  to  the  space  environment  because of the  relatively  short flight dura- 
tions.  Even  for  these  conditions? window Contamination was  noticed  on  some of the 
flights (refs. 1 and 2). 
The  Mercury window design  influenced  the  Gemini  and Apollo window designs. 
Major  changes  such as window size  and  number of assemblies were made;  however, 
the  basic  concept of a multipane  assembly,  wherein  elastomeric  sealants  were  used  for 
a pressure seal, was  retained. At the same  time,  other  portions of the spacecraft 
underwent  major  redesign,  but  the  resultant effects of these changes on the window 
assemblies  were not considered. It is now known that these changes  caused  major 
problems in the maintenance of satisfactory windows in the Gemini  and Apollo Programs. 
Window requirements  became  more  stringent as space  flights  increased  in  complexity. 
Rather  than  simply  providing a port  for viewing  and general photography, the windows 
became  critical  items  in docking maneuvers,  in  scientific  photography,  and,  eventually, 
in the lunar  landings. 
The first serious window-contamination problems  were  encountered  in the early 
Gemini  flights. It was  determined by means of analysis that the  majority of this con- 
tamination  was a silicone  oil that appeared on the outermost window surface as a highly 
viscous  fluid. This contamination  was  produced by outgassing of the Gemini  nose-cap 
heat shield. During  launch, ascent  heating of the spacecraft had caused the silicone 
oils  in the ablator  to  vaporize  and,  subsequently,  to  redeposit on  the  cooler window 
surfaces.  Also,  very  light  deposits  were  located on the  interior  surfaces of the three 
panel windows,  and the source of these  deposits  was  identified as outgassing of window- 
sealant  materials. 
Because  the  contamination  on the Gemini  spacecraft windows was a clear oily 
fluid  (during  flight), it did not interfere  severely with the functions of the spacecraft; 
therefore, immediate changes to the spacecraft were not considered necessary. Sev- 
e ra l  window modifications  were  made  for  the later flights of the  Gemini Program, 
however. One modification was a window cover  for  use  during the ascent  phase of 
flight;  another  modification  was a vacuum bake for the window sealants in an  effort  to 
reduce the amount of outgassing (ref. 3). These changes reduced the contamination 
considerably;  however,  during the last Gemini  flight,  contamination could be detected 
on the windows. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of the Gemini  window-contamination results was not 
concluded early enough to be used  in  the Apollo Program,  and  contamination  was a 
problem  again on the  command  module (CM) windows. In an  effort to provide  clean 
windows for docking and  other  operations,  the  cause of this contamination  was  examined 
in detail. The  physical  characteristics of the contamination  during  flight  were  obtained 
through  crew  debriefings,  and,  in  most  cases,  chemical  analyses of the contamination 
could be made from samples collected postflight. From these data and from the out- 
gassing  characteristics of the materials  used  in the window assemblies, it was  possible 
to identify the major  source of contamination:  condensation of high-molecular-weight 
substances  outgassed by sealant compounds. The results of the investigation that led 
to the  identification of the  contamination source as well as the  approach that was  taken 
to  reduce the contamination are presented  in this report. A similar  program  to  evaluate 
the  lunar  module (LM) windows is reported  also. 
COMMAND  MODULE  WINDOWS 
Window Design and Materials 
Five  multipane window assemblies are used on the Apollo CM. The  standard win- 
dow designation  used  for the CM is shown in  figure 1. Each  assembly has three  panes; 
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the two inner  panes are part  of the pressure-vessel  structure,  and the outer  pane is 
part of the heat-shield  structure.  Cross-sectional  views of these windows are shown in 
figures 2 to 4. The  outer  pane  protects the inner  panes  during  various  phases of the 
. mission, including entry of the spacecraft into the atmosphere. The rendezvous win- 
dows (numbered 2 and 4 in fig. l), as the name  implies, were designed  to  provide a 
' view of the LM during docking maneuvers. Most of the visual observations and photo- 
graphs were made  using the other three windows because the surface area of these 
windows is larger. 
Rendezvous wmdow 
Side window 
Rendezvous window 
Hatch wlndow - 2  
+ X  
Af Hatch window 
Rendezvous wmdow 
Rendezvous window 
Side wmdow 
Side window 
Figure 1. - Apollo CM window designation. 
q K b l a t o r  r o u t e r  silica pane 
,-Vacuum during orbit 
\ Inner aluminosilicate panes 
Figure 3. - Detail of CM rendezvous 
windows 2 and 4. 
The  panes of the window assemblies 
are constructed of two types of glass. Three 
different  coatings are used  in each assembly 
to improve the optical properties. The 
pressure-vessel  panes are made of tempered 
aluminosilicate  glass,  and  each  surface 
(surfaces 3 to 6 in fig. 5) of the double-pane 
construction is coated with a proprietary, 
Outer silica pane 
Vacuum during orbit 
ner  aluminosilicate panes 
Figure 2. - Detail of CM side 
windows 1 and 5. 
rAblator 
aluminosilicate 
Danes L D r y  Nz, 389 torr 
during 
orbit 
Figure 4. - Detail of CM hatch window 3. 
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antireflection  agent. This  coating  increases @ M ~ F ~  coating
the  total  light  transmission  through  the as- 
sembly by reducing  the  surface  reflections 
created by each  pane of the  multipane  con- 
struction. The heat-shield window panes 
are made of 100  percent  fused  silica  (Cor- 
ning glass 7940) and are coated on the ex- 4 
terior  surface  (surface 1 in fig. 5) with 
magnesium  fluoride (MgF2) and  on  the  in- 
terior surface  (surface 2 in  fig. 5) with a 
blue-red  coating  that is used as a spectral 
filter. 
Insulation 
Because of the  high temperatures 
that are encountered during entry, insula- Figure 5. - Command module window- 
tion is necessary between the heat shield surface notation used in contamination 
and the pressure-vessel  structure.  This  locations. 
insulation, as shown in figure 5,  extends 
to  the  edge of the  aluminum window frame and consists of four  1/2-inch layers of 
silicone-resin-impregnated  glass fibers bonded  with silicone  rubber RTV-511 (General 
Electric). The exterior of this composite, silica fibers and silicone rubber, is coated 
with an additional  layer of RTV-511. Any area of the  insulation  that is exposed  to 
astronaut view is sealed in a layer of aluminum  foil  reinforced with glass cloth  and is 
overcoated with black  silicone  rubber 92-018 (Dow Corning) for  antiglare  purposes. 
The  gasket  that  surrounds  the  heat- 
shield window is made of a glass-cloth- 
reinforced, heat-molded silicone rubber. 
The center is filled with a silica-fiber  in- 
sulating material. This gasket is applied 
to  the  glass  in two sections,  and the sec  - 
tion  joints are bonded  with silicone  rubber 
RTV-560 (General Electric). Also, sili- 
cone rubber RTV-560 is used as a seal* 
on the pressure-vessel window assembly 
and is applied  in  the areas shown in  fig- 
u re  6 by the  use of dams of heat-molded 
silicone rubber. Although slight geomet- 
ric  differences exist for the materials  used 
around  the  five windows, the  considera- 
tions  mentioned  previously are applicable 
generally. 
RN-560 
Window 
. .  
-Sealant 
dams 
Figure 6. - Detail of pressure-vessel- 
panel seal. 
After  the  pressure-vessel  panes are mounted and  sealed  to  the  frame,  the  area 
between  the  panes is evacuated  and  repressurized  to 389 tor r  with dry  nitrogen (N2). 
Then, the  assembly is sealed and  remains  sealed throughout its use.  The  space be- 
tween  the  pressure-vessel windows and  the  heat-shield windows is vented  to  ambient 
pressure. During flight, the pressure in this space is approximately 1 X 10 torr .  -4 
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I nflight Analysis of Window  Contamination 
Contamination of the  spacecraft windows was  observed as a problem on the early 
unmanned  Apollo  flights.  The window conditions of these  flights were evaluated by use 
of the  results of inflight  photography  and  postflight  analyses. These evaluation  tech- 
niques  were  limited  because, by the  use of photography  alone,  the window cannot be 
evaluated  from  various  angles,  and  postflight  analyses  must be made on surfaces  that 
were  contaminated  during  entry.  A  complete  objective  evaluation of the  contamination 
problem was obtained when the: Apollo 7 and 8 astronaut  reports  became  available. In 
general,  these  crew  reports  indicated  that  the  hatch  and side windows were  unusable 
for  most  purposes  because of contamination. In comparison, the rendezvous windows 
had  much less contamination  and  met the mission  requirements. 
Several  stages of contamination could be identified  from the flight  reports. This 
chronological  information,  in  conjunction with a description of the  appearance of the 
contamination,  helped  considerably  in  the  identification of the  contamination  sources. 
A  description of each  identifiable  stage of contamination is given  in  the following 
paragraphs. 
Because  the  spacecraft  in the prelaunch  phase of the  mission is exposed  to  atmos- 
pheric  weather  conditions,  rain  has  been a problem on some of the  flights. The water 
can  provide  collection sites for  other  contamination o r  can  collect  in  certain areas and, 
by evaporization and recondensation,  deposit on the windows during  flight.  This  source 
of contamination was a major  problem on the  Apollo 12 mission. 
During  jettison of the launch escape  tower  and  boost  protective  cover, a light 
gray  film  was  deposited on surface 1 of the Apollo 7 windows. Although this condition 
was not reported on  any of the  other  flights, it may  have  contributed  some window 
contamination on all flights. 
Soon after  earth-orbital  insertion, a 
film  appeared  on  surfaces 2 and 3 of the 
hatch  and side windows of the Apollo 7 
and 8 command modules. This contami- 
nation  continued  to  accumulate  during 
flight  and  resulted  in a heavy film  in  some 
locations  and  droplet  formation  in  other 
locations. A photograph, taken with a 
camera  focused on the hatch window during 
the Apollo 7 mission, is shown in  figure 7. 
During  the  night pass of the  spacecraft  in 
earth  orbit and during  other  similar  cold- 
window conditions, the contamination 
seemed  to  crystallize  and  become  opaque, 
particularly on the hatch window. 
Another source of contamination has 
been the waste-water-system  expulsions. 
Droplets  were  deposited on the windows 
during all Apollo flights when this system 
was activated. Figure 7. - Apollo 7 inflight hatch-window 
contamination. 
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In general,  however,  the  most  serious  contamination  was on surfaces 2 and 3 of 
the hatch  and side windows on  the Apollo 7 and 8 missions.  Crewmembers  from these 
two missions felt that, if the  contaminants  on these surfaces could be reduced or  elimi- 
nated, the minor  amount of contamination on the  outer  surfaces  was not  sufficiently 
serious  to  interfere with  visual  observations  and  photography. 
Chemical  Analysis of Contamination 
Identification of the sources of major  contamination on surfaces 2 and 3 of the 
hatch  and side windows and  confirmation of escape-tower-engine  exhaust  products as 
a minor  source of contamination on surface 1 of all windows were obtained by means 
of chemical  analysis of the  contaminants.  Surface 1 of the Apollo 7 and 8 windows was 
sampled  for  optical-emission  spectrographic  analysis.  Samples  were  collected  from 
surfaces 2 and 3 of the  hatch and side windows for infrared analysis. 
The results of optical-emission  spectrographic  analysis of the  contamination on 
surface 1 of the spacecraft windows are shown  in table I. The elements that were 
TABLE I. - OPTICAL-EMISSION  SPECTROGRAPHIC  RESULTS 
Element 
Aluminum 
Calcium 
Copper 
Iron 
Magnesium 
Sodium 
Nickel 
Lead 
Silicon 
Silver 
Tin 
1 
a 
M3 
M3 
bS 
M2 
M3 
C 
dMl 
S 
S 
M2 
S 
S 
2 
M3 
M3 
S 
M3 
M3 
M1 
S 
S 
M3 
S 
S 
Window number 
3 
M3 
M3 
S 
M3 
S 
M1 
S 
S 
M3 
S 
S 
4 
M3 
M3 
M2 
M3 
M1 
S 
S 
S 
M1 
S 
S 
1 
5 
M3 
M3 
S 
M3 
S 
M1 
S 
S 
S 
S 
a 
b~ = 0.1 to 1 percent, minor constituent. 
‘M = 5 to 10 percent, second major constituent. 
dM = 10 to 15 percent, first major constituent. 
M = 1 to 5 percent, third major constituent. 3 
2 
1 
6 
1; 
i present in large concentrations (such as calcium, magnesium, and sodium) are common 
' to seawater, to which the window was exposed during recovery operations. Elements 
(such as aluminum,  iron,  and  lead)  that  were classed as the  second  and  third  major 
constituents of the  contamination are not  common to any source of Contamination that 
would result  from  recovery  operations and special handling of the  spacecraft. How- 
ever, these elements are common to the escape-tower-engine fuel. Therefore, this 
engine  probably is a source of contamination. 
Because of high entry  temperatures and  recovery  conditions, no residue  from  the 
waste-water-dump  system was  expected  to  remain on the  heat-shield windows. None 
of the elements found on the window by means of spectrographic  analysis  can be traced 
directly  to  the  waste-water-dump  system. 
The infrared  spectra of contamination  collected  from  surfaces 2 and 3 on the 
windows of the Apollo 7 and 8 spacecraft were typical of organosilicon  high-molecular- 
weight compounds. A representative  spectrum of this  contamination is shown in  fig- 
I ure 8; the spectrum contains absorption bands common to the methyl-phenyl silicone 
structure. The same  type of contamination was identified  on  the window of an Apollo 
CM (2TV-1) that was used  for  thermal-vacuum  testing at the NASA Manned Spacecraft 
Center. 
I I 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I 
2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Wavelength. p 
L I  I 1 1 -  I I I L L  I I I I J 
Moo Moo m 1400 1m 1oW 800 650 
Figure 8. - Typical infrared spectrum of contaminations  from  surfaces 2 and 3 
on the Apollo 7 and 8 CM's. 
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To identify  the  specific  sources of contamination  on  surfaces  2  and 3, all nonme- 
tallic materials (16 types) that  were  used  in  the window areas were  tested  for outgas- 
sing at 66" C in a vacuum (1 X to r r )  (ref. 4). Outgassing tests were conducted in 
all-glass  sample  chambers  that were connected  to  individual  cold traps.  The  outgassing 
condensate  was  collected  in  the  upper  portions of the  sample  chambers (at 25" C) and 
in  the  cold  traps  (at 0" C). At. the end of the  exposure  time (9 days),  each  outgassing 
condensate  was  rated  according  to  relative  volume by use of an  arbitrary but  common 
scale. The results of these  screening tests and  comparisons of the  infrared  spectra of 
the  collected  condensate  and  contamination  from  the Apollo 7 spacecraft  indicated  that 
the  major  sources of contamination  were  silicone  rubbers 92-018, RTV-560, and 
RTV-511. 
Isothermal-vacuum  weight  loss of 1 
the  problem  materials was determined by 
use of a continuous-recording vacuum bal- 
ance. The vacuum weight loss of these 
materials at 93" C is shown in  figure 9. 
This  temperature was the  maximum  tem- 
perature  expected in flight  for  materials E 
that were used  in  the window area.  Sam- 
ples of all three materials had large ini- E ;  
tial weight-loss rates (approximately 
1.25  percent/hr)  that  subsequently,  after P 
15  hours,  decreased  to a much  smaller 
rate  ( pproximately  0.01  percenthr). 1 
- 
0)  a 
- - 
f 
OI .- 
Corrective  Action 
Because  the  weight-loss  rates  for 
the  problem  materials were small after 
0 
Temwrature: 25" C and 93" C 
Temperature: 93' C 
-Temperature 25" C 
I I I 
Time. hr  
a 16 24 
__I 
32 
- 
exposure to vacuum at tempera- Figure 9,  - Vacuum weight loss of window 
tures, an  apparent  solution  to  the  silicone- 
outgassing  problem  was  to  bake  the 
manufactured Darts in a vacuum  before 
materials  that  caused  contamination on 
surfaces 2 and 3. 
installation inthe spacecraft. This proc- 
e s s  was used with success  in  reducing  the 
Gemini window contamination (ref. 3). In applying a vacuum bake, it is desirable to 
use as high a temperature as possible  in  the  thermal-vacuum  exposure.  However, at 
high temperatures (approximately 250" C), polymer degradation is possible. There- 
fore, a temperature of 205" C was chosen as the  maximum  allowed  in  the  vacuum bake. 
At this temperature, the weight loss levels off (fig. 10). This condition indicates no 
major  thermally  induced  polymer  degradation  has  occurred. 
Further  considerations of the  corrective  action  indicated  that  the vacuum  bake 
should be conducted at low pressures  and  for long periods of time.  However,  because 
of limited  chamber  availability, a maximum  pressure of 1 x 10-1 torr  was allowed, and 
an  exposure  time of 1.72 X 10  seconds (48 hours),  divided  into two 8.64 X 10  -second 
(24 hours)  steps, was used.  The weight loss  during  and after exposure of the  materials 
5 4 
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Temperature: 25. C and 205. C 
i 2l 
- Temperature 205" C 
I I 
~ 
0 6 12  18 24 
Time, hr 
Figure 10. - Vacuum weight loss of RTV-560 
at temperatures  used in the manufac- 
turing  process at 1 x torr .  
6r Temperature: 205' C 
LPrebake  pressure 
1 x IO" torr 
r h s t b a k e  pressure 
1 x torr 
I 
0 15 30 45 
Time, hr 
Figure 11. - Vacuum  weight loss of RTV-560 
for  manufacturing  cycle  simulation. 
to a vacuum of 1 x 10-1 t o r r  at 205" C is 
shown in figure 11. Because the total 
weight loss after the vacuum  bake is small  
(approximately 0.08 percent)  and  because 
only a small  amount  (approximately 
0.008 percent) of this weight loss is con- 
densable  material at 25"  Cy a vacuum  bake 
at the  conditions selected (1 X 10-1 t o r r  for 
two 8.64 x 10 -second periods) was con- 
sidered adequate to prevent  contamination 
of the  spacecraft windows. 
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To  verify that vacuum  baking was  an 
adequate  solution for full-scale windows, 
an Apollo hatch  was  assembled  from  baked 
components  and  was tested in a large  vac- 
uum chamber. Heating was provided by a 
solar  lamp  and  supplemental  infrared  heat- 
ers. The hatch was tested under simulated 
earth-orbital  thermal  conditions  and  under 
conditions of maximum  heating  that  may  be 
encountered  in a maneuver  such as an at- 
titude hold for docking purposes. 
During the maximum  heating  condi- 
tions of the test, the maximum  tempera- 
ture that was  measured  for  the  nonmetallic 
materials  was 87" C ,  whereas  the  tem- 
perature of surface 2 of the  hatch window 
attained -20" C in the  cold  conditions of 
the test. A small  amount of contamina- 
tion was noticed  during a short  portion of 
the first cold-soak  period of the hatch 
test. The contamination disappeared 
early  in the first heating  cycle and did 
not reappear. This phenomenon had 
been  noticed  in ear l ier  tests and was 
attributed  to  water  vapor  trapped between 
the heat shield and the pressure-vessel 
structure. Post-test infrared analysis 
of the hatch-window surfaces indicated 
no  detectable  contamination. 
The Apollo 9 mission  was the first flight on  which  vacuum-baked parts  were 
used. The rendezvous windows had no contamination  problems  on earlier flights; 
therefore, it was  decided  to  use  baked parts only  on the  hatch  and side windows. 
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Crewmember  reports  and  the  postflight  examination  did  not  indicate any contamination 
problems on the windows made of baked parts. The  rendezvous windows, however, 
were  contaminated  slightly.  This  problem  did  not  cause  major  concern  because  sub- 
sequent  flights would involve  the  use of baked parts for all Uiindows. A  photograph 
(fig. 12) of the  hatch window of 2TV-1 (a test vehicle  that  revealed window contamina- 
tion  similar  to that found on  the Apollo 6, 7, and 8 flights) is compared with a grid 
photograph (fig. 13) of the Apollo 9 hatch window after recovery. In figure 13, the  grid, 
which is behind the window assembly, is shown clearly. Conversely, large amounts 
of contamination  over  the  entire window are shown in  figure 12. In this  photograph, 
condensation of the contamination  had  accumulated  to  such  an  extent  that  droplet  streaks 
were detectable. Although the photographs  were  not  taken  under  the  same  conditions 
(the 2TV-1 photograph had no grid),  they both indicate  that a significant  improvement 
was  obtained by the use of vacuum-baked parts. 
The  Apollo 10 mission  was the first  flight  for which  vacuum-baked parts  were 
used  for all window applications.  The  astronauts  reported no window contamination 
except a narrow  streak of droplets on surface 1 of side window 5.  This streak  was 
noticed after tower  jettison,  and  the  streak  remained  throughout  the  flight.  Postflight 
observations  indicated  that  this  contamination  probably  was  caused by extraneous  water 
under  the  boost  protective  cover.  The Apollo 11 spacecraft had  vacuum-baked parts 
for all window applications; no window contamination  was  encountered  that was caused 
by elastomer  outgassing. 
When the major  contamination  prob- 
lem  had  been  solved,  other  sources of 
contamination found  on the Apollo 9 and 10 
missions were reevaluated on subsequent 
missions. These additional sources 
Figure 12. - Hatch window of 2TV-1. 
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Figure 13. - Apollo 9 hatch window. 
included  tower  -jettison-engine  plumes, waste-water expulsions,  reaction-control- 
engine plumes, and rain. Contamination caused by the tower-jettison-engine plumes 
and  the  reaction-control-engine  plumes  was not noticed by either  crew.  Contamination 
caused by the  expulsion of waste  water was evident on all flights.  Because this con- 
tamination was minor  and  was  almost  completely  removed by short-duration  exposure 
to  the  sun,  corrective  action  was  not  considered  necessary.  Rainwater,  which was a 
major  problem on the Apollo 12 mission,  was  noticed  before  flight  on the exterior  sur- 
faces of the heat shield window. Apparently,  this  water  collected  contamination  from 
the escape-tower engine-firing sequence. After the water vaporized, the contamination 
remained on the window surface throughout  the  flight. This residue affected windows 1 
to 4.  Alterations  in  the  boost  protective  cover were made  in  an  attempt  to  prevent 
water leaks on subsequent  vehicles. 
LUNAR  MODULE  WINDOWS 
Window  Design  and  Materials 
Each of the three windows used on 
the LM has two panes:  one  pane  forms 
part of the pressure-vessel  structure, and 
the  other  pane  provides  micrometeoroid 
protection  for  the  pressure  -vessel  panes. 
The  locations of the two triangular  win- 
dows  that are designated as the forward  or 
landing  windows and a smaller docking 
window a r e  shown in figure 14. The for- 
ward windows are in front of the two crew 
stations, and the docking window is directly 
above  the  left-hand crew station. 
Docking 
window 
Forward- 
windows 
Figure 14. - Locations of LM windows. 
The materials  used  in both types of window assemblies  are  similar. The  outer 
panes of all windows are made of 96 percent  fused  silica  (Corning  glass 7900) and the 
inner  panes of chemically  strengthened  glass  (Corning  glass 0311). The outer  surfaces 
of all the  outer windows (surface 1 in  figs. 15 and 16) are coated with a blue-red  coat- 
ing that is used as a spectral filter. To prevent fogging of the windows when the LM is 
pressurized,  the  manufacturer  provided  an  electrically  conductive  coating on the  outer 
surface of the  inner  pane  (surface 3 in  figs. 15 and 16). This conductive coating per- 
mits the astronauts to  apply resistive  heating  to  the windows. The inner  surface of the 
inner  and  outer  panes is coated  with a high-efficiency  antireflection  agent  to  improve 
the  overall  optical  properties of the window assemblies.  Also,  various  markings  on 
the window surfaces are used  to  aid in  navigation. 
All three  outer  panes  are sealed into the vehicle  structure by the  use of a heat- 
molded rubber (Dow Corning Silastic 675-24-480), as shown in  figures 15 and 16. The 
thermal-insulation blanket that  protects  the window frame is held  in  place by an epoxy/ 
fiber-glass  retainer  ring. The forward-window pressure seal is made by pressing, 
with a Teflon  and  Silastic-jacketed  metal  spring,  the  inner  pane  against a silicone- 
rubber seat. The docking-window pressure seal is made by adhesively bonding the 
inner pane  directly  to a Kovar metal  frame.  Because  the LM does  not  have  to  survive 
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f- 
- Outboard 
Figure 15. - Cross  section of LM forward 
windows. 
Surface 1 
B- Pressure-vessel  wall 
Outboard 
Figure 16. - Cross  section of LM docking 
window. 
an  atmospheric  entry, the amount of insulation  material that is needed  around the win- 
dows is much less for the LM than for the CM. 
Preflight Evaluation 
As soon as it was  recognized that a serious  contamination  problem  existed on the 
CM, the LM window assemblies  were  examined  for a similar  problem.  Because  the 
major  source of contamination on the CM was  outgassing of nonmetallic  materials, 
weight loss was determined  for all the  nonmetallic  materials  in the LM windows. These 
weight-loss data are shown in table 11. In the  past, it has been  determined that a total 
weight loss of more  than a few tenths of 1 percent  can  cause  contamination  in  certain 
configurations.  Because  some of the materials tested for  use  in the LM windows  have 
total weight losses that fall in this class, it was  decided that a full-scale  configuration 
test should be made  to  determine if a contamination  problem existed. It  should be 
noted that, in  general, the weight loss of the LM-window materials  was much less than 
for the CM-window materials. 
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TABLE II. - VACUUM WEIGHT LOSS O F  LM WINDOW MATERIALS 
~ 
Material 
Silastic 675  -24-480 
Black  velvet  paint 
Metlbond 329 
Epon 828 
RTV 90 
Teflon TFE 
Aluminized  H-film 
-~ 
Total  vacuum  weight  loss,  percent 
0.08 
1.4 
.05 
.65 
.6 
.04 
-14 
The  full-scale  configuration window test  consisted of a 2.16 X 10 -second 
(60 hours)  thermal-vacuum  exposure of a complete  forward-window  assembly.  Through- 
out this  exposure,  the  pressure  was 1 x lom6 t o r r   o r  less. The  thermal  environment 
consisted of three continuous  phases that were  designed  to  simulate  the  most  severe 
heating  portions of flight. The first phase  was  used  to  simulate the unmanned trans- 
lunar  phase by means of cycling  between 5" and 32" C for 7 .2  x 10 seconds (20 hours); 
then, one cycle to 93" and -29" C was executed. The second  phase  consisted of a 
7.2 X 10 -second  simulation of the lunar-orbital  phase and included  cycling  between 
93" and 149 " C, followed by one  cycle  from 149" to -29" C. The  final  phase  was  used 
to  simulate a hot lunar  stay,  and the cycle  included  exposure  for 1.8 X 10 seconds 
(5 hours) a t  154" C, a drop  to -29" C, a short-term  cycle  back  to 154" C, and a recycle 
to -29 " C. All the temperatures  for the exposures  were  measured at the pressure- 
pane outer  surface. 
5 
4 
4 
4 
In addition  to pressure and  temperature  measurements,  photographs of a resolu- 
tion grid  were  taken  through the window assembly at intervals  during  the test to eval- 
uate  optical-property  changes. A more  detailed  optical-property  evaluation  was  made 
by light-transmission  measurements  before  and after testing.  Provisions  were  made 
to  collect  and  analyze  samples of any  surface  residue  that  remained  after  testing. 
The results of the  thermal-vacuum  exposures  indicated that no contamination 
problem existed within  the  temperature  and  pressure  limits of the space envi,ronment. 
Visual inspection after tests and  photographic  coverage  during tests did not indicate 
contamination; therefore, no samples were collected for analysis.  Post-test  trans- 
mission  measurements  were  representative of a loss of 3 to 4 percent, which possibly 
could  have been  caused by dust  collection  in the handling process.  This  loss is very 
small  and would not  affect  visual sightings o r  photography. 
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I nflight Evaluation 
I I I .I11 I I 
An evaluation of the LM window performance  was first obtained on the Apollo 9 
mission. On this and all subsequent LM flights,  the  astronauts  detected no unexpected 
contamination on the windows. As expected, upon pressurization of the LM, water 
condenses  and  collects  on the inner  surfaces of the  inner  panes. This condensate is 
removed by activation of the window heaters. In general, it can be concluded that the 
LM windows performed  satisfactorily. 
The relatively  contamination-free  condition of these windows might  seem  sur- 
prising  because it was  indicated earlier that  the  weight loss of the materials that were 
used  in  construction  was  rather  large  in  some  instances.  However, if table It and 
figures 15 and 16 are examined, it is clear that the materials  that  sustain  large weight 
losses are used  in  very  limited  amounts  and,  in  general, are not exposed  to  the area 
between the panes. There is one exception: the fiber-glass  retainer that involves an 
epoxy as the  matrix  material.  The weight loss for this material  was 0.65 percent. 
Because no contamination  problem was encountered, the amount of condensable  out- 
gassing  products  from the epoxy was assumed to be very low. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
All window assemblies  in the Apollo spacecraft  were  examined  for  contamination 
problems.  Primarily,  reduction of the optical  properties of the command module win- 
dows was  caused by the contamination  from  outgassing of silicone  sealants that were 
used  in  the  vicinity of the windows. This contamination was reduced  to  an  acceptable 
level, with respect to  mission  objectives, by means of vacuum  baking the silicone 
sealants. 
The lunar  module windows also were examined for the contamination  problems. 
A test program on the individual materials that were  used  in the window-assembly 
construction and a full-scale  configuration test indicated that no significant  contamina- 
tion problems  existed on  the  lunar  module window assemblies. The results of inflight 
evaluations  substantiated this conclusion. 
As far as contamination is concerned, the best spacecraft-window  design  should 
involve the use of a direct glass-to-metal seal. Currently,  such a design is not prac- 
tical for windows larger than  approximately 4 inches  in  diameter;  nonmetallic seals must 
be used.  Even  for  an  application  such as in the Apollo Program, the use of nonmetallic 
materials  around  optical  surfaces  must be controlled  very  closely.  For these applica- 
tions,  the first choice for a sealant  material  should be heat-molded  elastomers that 
can be cured at elevated  temperatures  and low pressures. If a room-temperature- 
vulcanizing agent is required, new products have become available recently. These 
new products  have  superior  outgassing  properties,  and  weight-loss  values  (in a thermal- 
vacuum  environment)  for these products are quite low and are comparable  to the weight 
loss of the  vacuum-baked parts that are  used on the Apollo spacecraft. 
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Window seals and  sealants are indeed  important when contamination  problems are 
considered.  However, as was evident  on  the Apollo command module, the overall win- 
dow design  must  be  considered  also. Materials that are used  in  the  main  or  supporting 
structure, as well as in other  applications  near  the window assembly,  must  be  tested 
to ensure low outgassing rates. Such an  approach was important  during  the Apollo 
Program  and  will  be  even  more  important  in  future  programs. 
Manned Spacecraft  Center 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
Houston, Texas, September 17, 1971 
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